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Abstract
The first chapter presents a dynamic game of imperfect information that en-
compasses previous analyses on political budget cycles (PBCs) and matches the
following recently documented facts: first, PBCs mostly occur in developing coun-
tries and are financed with debt; second, PBCs have little correlation with incum-
bent’s reelection probability in developing countries, and third, PBCs are nega-
tively correlated with incumbent’s reelection probability in developed countries.
The set of sequential equilibria of the game is shown to be tightly bound to the size
of political rents. In the unique equilibrium capable of matching the three facts
above, PBCs arise exclusively from the behavior of unproductive incumbents who
attempt to mimic competent governments by issuing debt. I introduce a set of
costly signals that convey information about incumbents’ performance and show
that voters acquire signals of increasing quality as economies grow. The ensuing
information asymmetry across income levels is shown to generate observed PBCs
patterns. I discuss possible long term effects of initial unproductive politicians in
office.
The second chapter builds a multisector growth model with monopolistically
competitive markets to gauge the quantitative relevance of sectoral shocks in ex-
plaining fluctuations of the US Industrial Production (IP) Index between 1972-
2007. The incorporation of market power and increasing returns hampers the
transmission of sector-specific shocks into related industries, which thereby erodes
the quantitative importance of sectoral perturbations for explaining economy-wide
fluctuations. In some calibrations, the fraction of aggregate IP fluctuations ex-
plained by sectoral shocks when departing from perfect competition falls 44%
between 1984-2007.
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Chapter 1
Political Budget Cycles,
Information and Development
1.1 Introduction
Since the cornerstone work of Downs (1957) there has been an extensive inquiry
on the relationship between politicians and economic aggregates, summarized for
instance in Drazen (2000) and Persson and Tabellini (2000). A salient feature
of this line of research has been the study of the link between fiscal policy and
elections, where a regular pattern has been established. In effect, starting with the
book by Tufte (1978), and continuing with the sweeping, more rigorous empirical
work by Blais and Nadeau (1992), Brender (2003), Brender and Drazen (2005) and
Schuknecht (2000), it has been determined that government spending increases
during election years in a systematic way across countries, a regularity coined with
the term Political Budget Cycle (PBC).
The landmark theoretical appraisal of this phenomenon given by Rogoff (1990)
characterizes PBCs as the equilibrium outcome of a signalling game between politi-
cians and voters. In his formulation, office-seeking politicians have different, pri-
vately known skills which evolve with time, but present some persistence. Voters,
in turn, use public information—taxes and government spending—to infer types
1
2and thus select the best candidate. In the unique separating equilibrium that
Rogoff obtains, only productive incumbents increase public spending in election
years, and hence the political budget cycle is a welfare-enhancing phenomenon
because it reflects efficient signaling by the most able politicians. Additionally,
unproductive politicians are always removed from office unless voters have an in-
trinsic, bold taste for them.1 Finally, a key assumption underlying his analysis
is that, apart from tax revenue, which is publicly observed, skills are the only
determinant of the amount of public good that a politician may produce.
Recent empirical studies, however, have bestowed new information on political
budget cycles. In particular, the panel evidence from Shi and Svensson (2006) and
Brender and Drazen (2008) suggests three facts: (i) political budget cycles occur
mostly in developing countries and are financed with debt; (ii) in developing
countries, election year increases in public spending do not hurt the incumbent
politician’s reelection prospects, and (iii) in developed countries, election year
increases in public spending do hurt the incumbent’s reelection prospects.
This evidence is unattained by Rogoff’s equilibrium in the following aspects.
First, the fact that rich-country voters punish rather than reward those politicians
who generate PBCs suggests that voters may perceive that increases in election-
year spending are caused by unproductive incumbents attempting to mimic effi-
cient outcomes. In other words, the evidence seems to point toward a moral hazard
perspective of PBCs stemming from the behavior of office-seeking, unproductive
politicians. Secondly, the fact voters in low-income countries show lesser disap-
proval of PBCs, suggests the presence of more information in developed countries,
which would allow the detection of hidden debt more easily. This informational
channel, in turn, would explain the empirical erosion of political budget cycles in
relatively richer countries.
The purpose of this paper is to build a model capable of matching the evi-
dence (i)—(iii) described above, and then use such model to ask what type of
1In the model voters have random preferences (McFadden (1974)) and thus voting is proba-
bilistic (Coughlin (1982)).
3politician is behind election-year increases in government spending. For this task I
borrow unrestrainedly from Rogoff’s original insights, namely politicians differing
in productivity and asymmetric information between voters and incumbents. I
introduce two main ingredients. First, apart from privately observe their produc-
tivity, office holders have the possibility of hidden borrowing; that is, incumbents
may borrow abroad and such move is only observed by voters with a lag. This
feature allows the separation of government spending from public good outcomes,
and plays a key role in the empirical match of the model. Second, voters may
buy a costly signal of varying precision that is correlated with politician’s hidden
action. This information market enables rich voters to afford accurate information
regarding incumbent’s performance.
I present a full characterization of the set of sequential equilibria of the game
I build. The key determinants behind these equilibria are two parameters: non-
pecuniary ego rents of politicians and the likelihood that unproductive politicians
become productive. For certain thresholds I obtain three ensuing equilibriums:
one in which there are no PBCs, another that corresponds to Rogoff’s outcome,
and finally an equilibrium where only unproductive politicians generate political
budget cycles.
The main thrust from the paper, however, stems from the third equilibrium
obtained. I show that for parameter values supported by the work of Besley
(2005), Caselli and Morelli (2004), Mattozzi and Merlo (2008), and Messner and
Polborn (2004), such equilibrium is capable of matching the facts (i)—(iii). In this
equilibrium outcome, unproductive incumbents end up using debt to mimic the
public spending standard of productive politicians. In such case, when voters face
a increase of public goods in election years, they cannot distinguish what type of
politician is actually in office and thereby randomize at the polls, which generates
fact (iii). This result still holds when voters may acquire informative signals, but
as voters get richer and therefore improve their monitoring over incumbents, the
PBC end up disappearing and any election-year increase in spending is punished
by voters at the polls, which resembles facts (i)–(ii).
4In the third equilibrium that I characterize then, I infer that political budget
cycles are far from reflecting efficient signalling, and instead may be harmful. As
long as voters cannot afford the cost of precise information, in which case they
are not able to figure out incumbent’s type, it is very likely that after elections
they will face both interest payments and, more importantly, an unproductive
politician again in office. I discuss possible long term effects of unproductive
incumbents in economies on early stages of development.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows: in § 1.2 I briefly review the lit-
erature on political budget cycles. In § 1.3 I lay out the game with no information
market and characterize its equilibrium set. In § 1.4 I introduce an information
market to study the transition of political budget cycles along income path doc-
umented in the data.
51.2 Literature
Rogoff (1990) is the landmark theoretical work on political political budget cy-
cles, a line of research initiated with the empirical work by Tufte (1978) and then
studied with the subsequent work by Blais and Nadeau (1992), Brender (2003),
Brender and Drazen (2005), Brender and Drazen (2008), Schuknecht (2000) and
Shi and Svensson (2006). There are different explanations, however, for the rela-
tionship between budget deficits and elections. Brender and Drazen (2005) argue a
new democracies effect: voters of young democracies are not familiarized with elec-
tions, and thence subject to manipulation by opportunistic incumbents. Saporiti
and Streb (2008) relate PBCs to separation of powers and the role of legislature.
Drazen and Eslava (2010) and Brender and Drazen (2013) document that instead
of changes in level, elections go along with modifications in the composition of
government spending.
Apart from Rogoff (1990), my work is closely related to Shi and Svensson
(2006) and Alt and Lassen (2006). The former established empirically that PBCs
mainly occur in developing countries, and both papers study the reasons behind
such regularity. The authors argue that since corruption is higher and there
are fewer voters with access to information in poorer countries, it follows that
opportunistic governments have ample space to issue debt and manipulate vot-
ers’ expectation regarding incumbent’s ability. They use a career-concerns model
(Holmstro¨m (1999)) where an exogenous fraction of the population cannot observe
debt and politicians set policy before they learn their productivity. They obtain a
PBC, where each politician, regardless from his type, will increase debt in election
years and will face a 50% probability of reelection.
While I share their heuristic argument that information is the channel behind
fact (i) in § 1.1, we have three stark differences. First, I model information as an
endogenously determined, equilibrium object along the lines of Amir and Lazzati
(2011), Martinelli (2006) and Persico (2000). Second, building from Besley (2005),
Caselli and Morelli (2004), Mattozzi and Merlo (2008), and Messner and Polborn
6(2004), I make explicit the point that politicians do not behave equally, in partic-
ular, since political and market skills correlate positively, incumbents may have
heterogenous preferences for keeping office. Finally, I state that politicians set
policy having private information, which is demonstrably an important ingredient
in this area or research (v.gr. Ferejohn (1986)).
Starting from these building blocks I am able to characterize clearly the rela-
tionship between political budget cycles, quality of information and income, and
also make more transparent the transition of the equilibria as income increases.
Moreover, I also take into account voters’ response to make it consistent with the
data, which was not considered by previous work. Finally, and more importantly,
my setup enables the comparison with Rogoff’s claim regarding the efficiency of
PBCs, which is the core issue behind this strand of literature.
The idea that underlies my analysis is the possible endogenous erosion of moral
hazard as economies develop, and idea that has been studied in a different context
by Acemoglu and Zilibotti (1999). The conclusion of my analysis is related to
Acemoglu, Egorov, and Sonin (2010) and Caselli and Morelli (2004) regarding
possible explanations for the endogenous persistence of bad politicians in office.
Following Banks and Sundaram (1998), however, I completely shut down the
adverse selection of the model and I just consider that the unique tool of voters
to provide incentives is given by the reelection decision.
This paper is also related to the empirical and theoretical literature on trans-
parency and economic policy across countries, a sample given by Alesina et al.
(1999), Gavazza and Lizzeri (2009), Hameed (2005), Islam (2006), Kopits and
Craig (1998) and Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi (2010). Finally, my work is
consistent with the experimental literature on the impact of information on the
quality of choice by voters in developing countries, which is summarized by Pande
(2011).
71.3 Model
Consider the following environment: there is a set of politicians P with measure
one, where a fraction ρ ∈ (0, 1) of them are productive, i.e. have associated a
number θ ∈ R+, while the rest are associated with θ, where 0 < θ < θ ≤ 1.
In each of the periods t = 1, 2, 3, a voter is endowed with y ∈ R+ units of a
consumption good, which may also be transformed into a public good through a
linear technology which is under the control of a politician. In order to finance
the provision of such public good there is an exogenously fixed tax rate τ ∈ [0, 1]
on voter’s endowment. Additionally, it is also possible for the politician to borrow
some extra units of the consumption good abroad at an interest rate r > 0.
In this environment the following dynamic game of imperfect information be-
tween a single voter v and a randomly selected politician p ∈ P ensues. Denote this
game by Γ. Each t ∈ {1, 2, 3}, the politician chooses an action apt ∈ Ap = {b, 0},
where b ≡ (θ−θ)τy/θ > 0 is the feasible amount of debt that p may issue abroad.2
On the other hand, v may keep or fire the incumbent politician at the beginning
of the last period, that is, v chooses the action avt ∈ Av(t), where
Av(t) =
{k} if t = 1, 2,{k, f} if t = 3.
There are two sources of asymmetric information: First, p’s action is observed
by v after one period lag. Additionally, p’s productivity θt ∈ Θ = {θ, θ} is pri-
vate information. Moreover, as in Phelan (2006), a politician’s type may change.
Formally, the following Markov process is assumed for the productivity sequence
{θt}, where the state θ is assumed absorbing for the sake of simplicity
Pr(θt+1 = θ|θt = θ) = ε ∈ (0, 1).
2In Rogoff’s model politicians choose taxes and spending over compact, convex spaces. While
p’s action space here is simpler, it has the advantage of not centering the analysis on out-of-
equilibrium beliefs as Rogoff does by using the framework of Bagwell and Ramey (1988) and
Cho and Kreps (1987).
8Each pair (apt , θt) ∈ Ap×Θ together with the endowment y, the tax rate τ and the
interest payments (1 + r)apt−1, determines the publicly observed amount of public
good gt as follows
gt ≡ g(a
p
t , θt; a
p
t−1) = θt
(
τy + apt − (1 + r)a
p
t−1
)
.
Both the voter and the incumbent politician derive utility from the consumption of
the public good. The incumbent, in addition, gets nonpecuniary rents e(θt) ∈ R+
from holding office. For simplicity, I assume that v’s endowment is fully taxed,
i.e. τ ≡ 1. In this case, stage rewards are given by3
upt ≡ u
p(apt , a
v
t , θt; a
p
t−1) = gt + e(θt)I{avt=k},
uvt ≡ u
v(apt , a
v
t , θt; a
p
t−1) = gt,
There are two kinds of histories in this game: private and public. A pri-
vate history htp = (a
p
1, . . . , a
p
t , θ1, . . . , θt) ∈ H
t
p keeps track of the incumbent
politician’s actions and type. A public history of events, in turn, is a sequence
ht = (ap1, . . . , a
p
t , g1, . . . , gt) ∈ H
t, where H ≡
⋃
tH
t. Such public histories are
used by v to assess the probability of having a productive incumbent in office.
That is, v’s beliefs regarding p’s type are a sequence
µ = {µt}
3
t=1, µt : H → ∆(Θ), µt = (πt, 1− πt),
where πt(h
t−1) = Pr(θt = θ | h
t−1) is the posterior probability of facing a produc-
tive politician. Since there is a fraction ρ ∈ (0, 1) of productive politicians in P ,
it follows that π1 ≡ ρ.
A strategy for p in this game is a function σp specifying the probability of
borrowing σpt (h
t−1
p , θt) ∈ [0, 1] for each t, h
t−1
p , θt. A strategy for v, instead, is a
function σv specifying the probability of reelection σvt (h
t−1) ∈ [0, 1] for each t, ht−1.
3In § 1.4.2 I discuss the role of τ on the information acquisition decision of the voter.
9A profile of strategies σ = (σp, σv) ∈ Σ induces payoffs
Uι(σ) = E
σ,µ
3∑
t=1
uιt, ι ∈ {p, v},
where Eσ,µ denotes the expectation operator given the assessment (σ, µ) ∈ Σ ×
∆(Θ)3.
The following assumptions are in force throughout the paper4
ρ > ε. (1.1)
θ > χ θ. (1.2)
Assumption 1.1 states that it is more likely to pick a productive politician ran-
domly selecting from P than expect a productivity jump by an unproductive
politician throughout his tenure. Hence, if types were observable by voters, they
would dismiss unproductive incumbents. Assumption 1.2, in turn, prevents the
productivity gap between politicians of different types from being too wide. Un-
der this assumption, if the voter confronts an scenario in which he faces a public
history possibly caused by an unproductive politician, it may be still sequentially
rational for him to respond to such history with a positive probability of reelection.
I begin the study of this game with the following definition that simplifies
notation.
Definition 1. A public history ht−1 ∈ H is revealing if πt(h
t−1) ∈ {0, 1} ∀σp.
The first result of the analysis is that there is a unique history h2 ∈ H that
inhibits v from certainly inferring p’s type before the election. That history is
precisely a relatively higher public good production right before the election.
4The parameter χ ∈ (0, 1) is given by
χ ≡ max
{
1 + r
2− ρ
,
(1 + r)(1 − ε)(ρ− ε)
(2 + r)(1 − ε)(ρ− ε)− ε(1− ρ)
}
.
10
Lemma 1. Every public history h2 = (ap1, g1, g2) 6= (0, θy, θy) is revealing.
Proof. Since Ap and Θ are finite, debt has one-period maturity, and θ is an absorb-
ing state, it follows by construction that there is a finite set of histories possibly
faced by v at the end of t = 2. If v faces h2 ∈ H = { (0, θy, θy) , (b, θy, θy − θ(1 +
r)b) , (b, θy, θy − θ(1 + r)b) }, then π3(h
2) = 0, as each g2 embedded in this set of
histories is strictly less than what a θ–type would produce. On the other hand,
if h2 ∈ H = { h2 ∈ Hc : h2 6= (0, θy, θy) } it follows that π3(h
2) = 1 because
each second-period public good outcome arising from these histories is infeasible
for the θ–type. Finally, if h2 = (0, θy, θy), and since θy = g(0, θ; 0) = g(b, θ; 0),
then v cannot distinguish whether this history is the result of a productivity shock
according to the Markov process followed by θt or the consequence of unobserved
borrowing, and therefore, because of Bayesian consistency, any σp2(h
1, θ2) > 0
induces beliefs µ3(h
2) that lie in the interior of ∆(Θ).
By Lemma 1 then, we can express the set of public histories possibly faced
by the voter before the election as the partition H
⋃
H
⋃
{(0, θy, θy) }, where H
corresponds to histories that reveal the presence of a productive incumbent, and
histories in H reveal an unproductive type in office.
Consider now the following partition of the space of nonpecuniary rents of
politicians: (e(θ), e(θ)) ∈ R2+ = A
⋃
B
⋃
C, where
A ={ (e(θ), e(θ)) ∈ R2+ : e(θ) < e, εe(θ) + (1− ε)e(θ) < e},
B ={ (e(θ), e(θ)) ∈ R2+ : e(θ) ≥ e ∀ e(θ) },
C ={ (e(θ), e(θ)) ∈ R2+ : e(θ) < e, εe(θ) + (1− ε)e(θ) ≥ e},
and the thresholds e, e are defined by
e = (θ − θ)(y − (1 + r)b),
e = rθb− (1− ρ)(θ − θ)y.
The number e reflects the amount of ego rents that makes a θ–type indifferent
11
between facing a low production of public goods after being reelected or enjoy a
high amount of public goods as a citizen ousted from office; that is e+ g(0, θ; b) =
g(0, θ; b). The number e on the other hand, indicates the amount of ego rents
that exactly compensate a θ–type from the interest payments he would face as a
reelected incumbent after election-year borrowing.
One particular area deserves special attention. The set of nonpecuniary rents
C reflects that elections are high-stake tests for unproductive politicians only. Its
rationale builds from the work of Caselli and Morelli (2004), which puts forward
the argument that market and political skills are positively correlated, and then
productive politicians may disregard the perks of holding office because they may
opt to higher rents in the private sector, a point also illustrated by Besley (2005).
Additionally, highly productive politicians may be willing to pursue spells in public
office in the first place as a showcase to make their skills publicly known, as
Mattozzi and Merlo (2008) point out. This reasoning finds support in the evidence
of Diermeier, Keane, and Merlo (2005) who use data of the U.S. Congress and
find that reelections increase future market wages of politicians in a substantial
manner.
As I describe and prove in propositions 1–4, the thresholds of nonpecuniary
rents e and e—and the corresponding partition (A,B,C)—give rise to different
equilibrium outcomes: one that features no PBCs, one that captures Rogoff’s
(1990) equilibrium, and finally an equilibrium based on rents belonging to C that
matches of evidence described in § 1.1. These equilibria are shown in Figure 1.1.
12
Figure 1.1: Equilibrium strategies as a function of rents
e e(θ)e
e(θ)
e
σ˜ – Rogoff (1990)
σ – no PBC
σˆ – data match
The strategy profile σ corresponds to a sequential equilibrium of Γ where no
politician ever borrows, because nonpecuniary rents in the set A are not enough to
compensate incumbents for interest payments in the case of the θ–type, or lower
future public goods in the case of the θ–type.
Proposition 1. If (e(θ), e(θ)) ∈ A, then σ is the unique sequential equilibrium of
Γ, where
σpt (h
t−1
p , θt) = 0 ∀ t, h
t−1
p , θt.
σv3(h
2) =
0 if h2 ∈ H,1 if h2 ∈ H⋃{(0, θy, θy)}.
13
Proof. Consider v’s strategy. Under Assumption 1.1, it is optimal for v to fire the
incumbent after observing public histories h2 ∈ H and reelect in the case that
h2 ∈ H . Since the incumbent will never borrow under σp, v is sure to be facing
a θ–type if observes h2 = (0, θy, θy). Thus, σv is optimal. On the other hand,
since (e(θ), e(θ)) ∈ A it is never profitable for the incumbent to borrow before
the election, regardless of his type. In effect, in the case of the θ–type, since σv
awards reelection after h2 ∈ H
⋃
{(0, θy, θy)}, productive incumbents may avoid
interest payments and still be reelected with probability one.
In the case of the θ–type, if he borrows he gets for sure ego rents εe(θ)+(1−ε)e(θ),
but since he also faces interest payments and (e(θ), e(θ)) ∈ A, it follows that ap2 = b
is strictly dominated by zero borrowing. The optimality of no borrowing in the
first period follows from the same logic as in t = 2 for the both types.
Concerning uniqueness, suppose there is another equilibrium σ′. In the case of the
voter, under Assumption 1.1, σv3
′(h2) = σv3(h
2) ∀h2 ∈ H
⋃
H . If h2 = (0, θy, θy),
then—under (e(θ), e(θ)) ∈ A—there is no optimal strategy σp ′ specifying a posi-
tive probability of borrowing, and then it is also the case that σv3
′(h2) = σv3(h
2)
for h2 = (0, θy, θy). Suppose finally that σp ′ 6= σp. This implies that borrowing
is optimal for some type under some history of events, but then it must be the
case that ego rents compensate an incumbent after election-year borrowing, which
contradicts the fact that (e(θ), e(θ)) ∈ A. Hence σ′ = σ.
The strategy profile σ˜ in Figure 1.1 captures the essence of Rogoff’s (1990)
equilibrium. In this case, the θ–type increases election-year spending to separate
himself from the unproductive type. As the θ–type foresees separation, he decides
not to borrow and so avoid interest payments after being fired. This equilibrium
is sustained by the decision of the voter of conceding reelection only to histories in
H , which encourages the θ–type to borrow and is consistent with the fact that such
type gets sufficient ego rents to make up for interest payments after reelection.
Proposition 2. If (e(θ), e(θ)) ∈ B then σ˜ is the unique sequential equilibrium of
14
Γ, where
σ˜pt (h
t−1
p , θt) =

0 if t = 1 ∀ θ1,
0 if θ2 = θ, h
1
p = (a
p
1, θ) ∀ a
p
1,
0 if θ2 = θ, h
1
p = (a
p
1, θ) ∀ a
p
1,
1 if θ2 = θ, h
1
p = (a
p
1, θ) ∀ a
p
1.
σ˜v3(h
2) =
0 if h2 ∈ H
⋃
{(0, θy, θy)},
1 if h2 ∈ H.
Proof. Consider v’s strategy. Since θ is absorbing, it is optimal for v to reelect
incumbents after public histories h2 ∈ H. Under Assumption 1.1, instead, it is
optimal for v to fire incumbents when observing h2 ∈ H . Now consider h2 =
(0, θy, θy). Such history is feasible for any type, but under σ˜p it can be only the
result of an unproductive incumbent. In this case, v’s action prescribed by σ˜v,
av3 = f , is optimal.
Now consider p’s strategy. In the first period no incumbent is willing to borrow:
if θ1 = θ, then no extra borrowing is necessary for such incumbent to reveal his
type, and if θ1 = θ, then such politician prefers not to face interest payments
because he will be ousted from office anyways. If h1p = (a
p
1, θ) and θ2 = θ, then p’s
expected utility is given by
Eσ˜
3∑
t=2
upt =
θy + (ρθ + (1− ρ)θ)y if a
p
2 = 0,
θ(y + b) + θ(y − (1 + r)b) + e(θ) if ap2 = b.
Since e(θ) ≥ e it follows that σ˜p2(h
1
p, θ) = 1 is optimal. If θ2 = θ after h
1
p = (a
p
1, θ),
since σ˜v(h2) = 0 after h2 = (0, θy, θy), if follows that it is optimal for p not
to borrow as σ˜p indicates. Finally, since a productive-born type automatically
generates public histories h2 ∈ H, it is optimal for him to set ap1 = 0. Uniqueness
follows from the same steps in Proposition 1 under (e(θ), e(θ)) ∈ B.
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Now, consider the strategy profile σˆ = (σˆp, σˆv), defined as follows
σˆpt (h
t−1
p , θt) =

0 if t = 1 ∀ θ1,
0 if θ2 = θ ∀h
1
p,
0 if θ2 = θ, h
1
p = (b, θ),
λˆp if θ2 = θ, h
1
p = (0, θ).
σˆv3(h
2) =

0 if h2 ∈ H,
1 if h2 ∈ H,
λˆv if h
2 = (0, θy, θy),
where
λˆp =
ε(1− ρ)y
(1− ε)(ρ− ε)(y − R)
∈ (0, 1), (1.3)
λˆv =
( ρθ + (1− ρ)θ )R− (θ − θ)y
(1− ε)X − (θ − θ)(ρ− ε)(y − R)
∈ (0, 1). (1.4)
This strategy profile establishes one the one hand that productive politicians
never borrow, and the other that all of those unproductive-born incumbents that
keep their type borrow right before elections. In other words, σˆp induces a political
budget cycle that is exclusively generated by unproductive politicians. In the
case of the voter, σˆv calls for reelection of productive incumbents in the event in
which v may infer types, that is, in the case in which h2 ∈ H
⋃
H. If the voter,
however, faces the non-revealing public history h2 = (0, θy, θy), then σˆv prescribes
randomization at the polls. As the following result shows, if the possibility that
an unproductive politician becomes productive is sufficiently unlikely, then the
strategy profile σˆ actually corresponds to equilibrium behavior.
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Proposition 3. If (e(θ), e(θ)) ∈ C then ∃ ε > 0 : ∀ ε ∈ (0, ε), (σˆ, µˆ) is a
sequential equilibrium of Γ.
Proof. Consider first v’s strategy. If h2 ∈ H , Lemma 1 implies πˆ3(h
2) = Pr(θ2 =
θ | h2) = 0, and then Assumption 1.1 entails that it is optimal for v playing the
pure strategy av3 = f , because it is more likely to select a θ–type from a new draw
than expect a productivity switch of the incumbent. If h2 ∈ H , then πˆ3(h
3) = 1,
and since θ is an absorbing state, it follows that setting av3 = k is the best response
by v. When v faces the unique non-revealing history h2 = (0, θy, θy), his expected
utility is
Eσˆ,µˆuv3 =
πˆ3θy + (1− πˆ3)Eεθ(y − (1 + r)b) if av3 = k,πˆ3Eρθy + (1− πˆ3)Eρθ(y − (1 + r)b) if av3 = f, (1.5)
where Ejθ ≡ jθ + (1 − j)θ, j = ρ , ε. Bayesian consistency of beliefs µˆ3(h
2) =
(πˆ3, 1− πˆ3) ∈ ∆(Θ) requires
πˆ3 =
ε
ε+ (1− ε)λˆp
,
and then, given (1.3), v ends up indifferent between keeping or firing the incum-
bent, and therefore randomization is a sequentially rational move after h2. Hence,
given µˆ, σˆv is optimal.
On p’s side, if θt = θ, it follows that borrowing in any period is a strictly domi-
nated strategy. In effect, given that θ is an absorbing state, e(θ) = 0, and r > 0,
each time the θ–type borrows his payoff is reduced by rb > 0, and therefore
σˆpt (h
t−1
p , θ) = 0 is a best response, regardless of the evolution of the game. If
θ1 = θ, σˆ
p calls for ap1 = 0. If p deviates nonetheless, according to Lemma 1, he
generates revealing histories that will drive him with probability one to be either
fired or reelected, depending on his second-period type. The value of the deviation
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ap1 = b by the θ–type is then
5
∆(ε) ≡ Λ(θ − θ)−
{(
εθ + (1− ε)θ
)
(1 + r)b+ (1− ε)2λˆvX
}
.
The first term on the RHS represents the expected benefit of the deviation, while
the term in curly brackets represents its expected cost. Since εe(θ)+(1−ε)e(θ) > e,
it follows from Assumption (1.2) that limε→0∆(ε) < 0, and since ∆ : (0, 1)→ R is
a continuous function, then there exists a neighborhood Nε(0) such that ∆(ε) < 0
for each ε ∈ (0, ε). Roughly speaking, since the θ–type at t = 1 foresees that it
is very likely that he will keep his type during the next term, and that he does
not lose to much g if reelected (θ > χ θ), then his best response is borrowing just
before the election to try to get the political rent X . In the event, however, in
which a θ–type borrows in the first period and does not change his type, his best
response at t = 2 is not borrowing, because under Lemma 1 he will be dismissed,
and in such contingency he prefers to avoid interest payments at t = 3.
Finally, if a θ–type followed σˆp in the first period and also keeps his type for the
second period, then—given (1.4)—p is indifferent between borrowing or not, and
thus willing to randomize during t = 2. Hence σˆp is optimal and consequently
(σˆ, µˆ) is a sequential equilibrium.
Proposition 4. For (e(θ), e(θ)) ∈ C and ε ∈ (0, ε), (σˆ, µˆ) is unique.
Proof. Suppose there is another sequential equilibrium (σ, µ) ∈ Σ×∆(Θ)3. Con-
sider σv first. By Lemma 1, if h2 ∈ H
⋃
H, then v plays pure strategies because
he knows which θ2–type is actually facing. If h
2 ∈ H , then Assumption 1.1 implies
σv3(h
2) = 0, and if h2 ∈ H , then σv3(h
2) = 1, because θ is absorbing.
Now assume that v faces h2 = (0, θy, θy) instead. Suppose that σv3(h
2) calls for the
5Where
Λ ≡
{
y + ε(1− λˆv)(1− ρ)y + (1− ε)λˆv(ρ− ε)(y − λˆp(1 + r)b) + (1 − ε)λˆp(Eρθ(1 + r) − θ)
y
θ
}
.
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pure strategy av3 = f . In this case, a θ–type would prefer not borrow so as to avoid
interest payments when thrown out of office. Therefore, h2 = (0, θy, θy) would be
the result of a productivity shock, and then, since v would be facing unequivocally
a θ–type, av3 = f is not optimal. If σ
v
3(h
2) requires av3 = k instead, then—since
εe(θ) + (1 − ε)e(θ) ≥ e—a productive type plays ap2 = b with probability one.
Hence, according to Bayes’ rule, the probability that v faces a θ–type—given that
a θ-type does not borrow—is π3(h
2) = ε. Under this beliefs, and (e(θ), e(θ)) ∈ C,
the optimal strategy for v is av3 = f . As a result σ
v must involve a mixed strategy,
but then v must be indifferent between keeping or firing p, and the only way this
happens is when σp2((0, θy), θ) equals λˆp.
On p’s side, if θt = θ, then σ
p must specify no borrowing for each t, as it is the
case of σˆp, because r > 0, θ absorbing, and e(θ) = 0, imply that each loan cuts
p’s payoff by rb > 0.
If a θ–type borrows in the first period then he induces revealing histories that
trigger pure-strategy responses by v, which in turn will induce no borrowing in
the second period by p, regardless of his type. Since σp2((0, θy), θ) = λˆp, it follows
that p’s expected gain of playing ap1 = b instead of a
p
1 = 0 is given by ∆(ǫ), pos-
sibly for a different λˆv. But even if the probability of reelection is different, (1.2)
implies ∆(ε) < 0, so ap1 = b is not optimal.
Finally, suppose σp calls for the pure strategy ap2 = b for a θ–type. After the
history h1 = (0, θy), the strategy σp2(h
1, θ) = 1 induces beliefs π3(h
1, θy) = ε, that
in turn force v to play the pure strategy av3 = f , which thereby breaks the opti-
mality of setting ap2 = b with probability one. On the contrary, if σ
p
2(h
1, θ) = 0,
then Bayes’ rule implies π3(h
1, θy) = 1, and therefore v plays the pure strategy
av3 = k, but this move again contradicts the optimality of the pure strategy a
p
2 = 0.
Consequently, σp2(h
1, θ) must comprise a mixed strategy, which is only the case
when p is indifferent, and that occurs exclusively when σp2(h
1, θ) = λˆv. In sum,
(σ, µ) = (σˆ, µˆ).
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1.3.1 Multiple Elections
As it is hitherto formulated, the game Γ depicts a one-shot election, but it can
be equivalently considered as a single piece from an infinite-horizon endowment
economy with elections every other period, where there is a term limit on incum-
bent reelection. Hence, every time that a fresh incumbent jumps into office the
game Γ ensues.
Consider the evidence that could be generated by the sequential equilibrium
profile σˆ. There are three possible combinations of types before an election, and
each of those give rise to different equilibrium actions specified by σˆ. In the case of
permanently unproductive incumbents (θ1, θ2) = (θ, θ)—which sum (1−ρ)(1−ε)—
they increase spending with probability λˆp before the election, say from 1 to 2, and
this generates an amount of public goods (g1, g2) = (g, g), where g denotes a high
amount of public goods. In Table 1.1 I show spending, output and probability of
reelections generated by the equilibrium σˆ.
Table 1.1: Empirical evidence induced by σˆ.
Types Quantity Spending Output Prob. re-election
(θ, θ) (1− ρ)(1− ε)
λˆp : (1,2) (g, g) λˆv
(1− λˆp) : (1,1) (g, g) 0
(θ, θ) (1− ρ)ε (1,1) (g, g) λˆv
(θ, θ) ρ (1,1) (g, g) 1
If an econometrician observes data from Table 1.1 and runs a probit regression
between reelections and government spending, he would obtain that the proba-
bility of reelection for incumbents conditional on flat spending, that is, without
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political budget cycles, is given by
Pr( re-election | spending (1,1) ) =
λˆv(1− ρ)ε+ ρ
(1− ρ)(1 − ε)(1− λˆp) + (1− ρ)ε+ ρ
. (1.6)
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In the following table I show that for parameter values satisfying Assumptions
1.1–1.2 and rents (e(θ), e(θ)) ∈ C, the equilibrium σˆ matches fact (iii) in § 1.1,
i.e. an incumbent that generates a political budget cycle may face the same prob-
ability of reelection as if spending had been flat. This is a result for developing
countries because—as § 1.4 will show—I am still implicitly assuming that addi-
tional information regarding incumbents is unaffordable for the voter, a fact that
is associated with developing countries.
The intuition behind the result in Table 1.2 lies in the different information
sets between the voter and the econometrician. Suppose that there was a low
amount of public good in t = 1. Now, when the voter attends the polls, he
merely knows the current amount of public goods g2. If before the election there
is a higher amount of public goods, the voter does not know whether spending
increased—i.e. a PBC occured—or there was a productivity improvement, and
thus randomizes according to (1.4). This is not the case for econometrician, who
is capable of incorporating information regarding spending in his regressions and
therefore automatically spots election-year extra spending to calculate (1.6).
Table 1.2: Calibration.
Parameters
θ θ ε ρ y τ r
1 0.7 0.15 0.4 1.15 1 0.1
Results Pr( re-election | spending (1,1) ) = λˆv = 0.79
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1.4 Information Acquisition
The main thrust of the evidence uncovered by Brender and Drazen (2005, 2008)
and Shi and Svensson (2006) is that political budget cycles do not occur evenly
across countries. In particular, Shi and Svensson (2006) and Brender and Drazen
(2008) draw a complimentary picture: on the one hand Shi and Svensson (2006)
argue that political budget cycles belong mostly to developing countries, and on
the other Brender and Drazen (2008) shows that the probability of reelection
for an incumbent of a less developed country is not affected by PBCs; it is in
developed countries where incumbents are punished at the polls if they increase
fiscal deficits in election years.
This evidence is at odds with voter’s response of Rogoff’s equilibrium. In ef-
fect, if the random part of voter’s utility in such formulation is left aside, then
the political budget cycle is accompanied by assured reelection for the incumbent,
but this fact is not supported by the data (Brender and Drazen (2008)). The evi-
dence does suggest, in turn, that as countries get richer they tend to monitor more
closely the performance of incumbents. This vision is also embraced by the exper-
imental evidence summarized by Pande (2011), which shows that poor-country
voters struggle to select able incumbents because they cannot afford information.
Furthermore, when they are exogenously endowed with the relevant information
they, for instance, remove corrupt incumbents from office.
1.4.1 Exogenous Signals
From now on I assume that (e(θ), e(θ)) ∈ C. Building from all of these insights
and from the work of Persico (2000); Martinelli (2006) and Amir and Lazzati
(2011), I modify the game of the previous section by giving v the possibility of
getting partially informed regarding p’s hidden action, so as to investigate the fate
of the political budget cycle and voter’s equilibrium behavior as more information
is accessed.
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Suppose that after the history h1 = (0, θy)—i.e. a public record of low first-
period public good—player v has the option of buying a signal that conveys infor-
mation about p’s second-period action at some cost. Since ap2 is privately known, v
appraises p’s action as a random variable a˜ ∈ Ap. Let the signal s be a Ap-valued
random variable and, as in Martinelli (2006), assume
Pr(s(η) = ω | a˜ = ω) =
1
2
+ η, ω ∈ Ap, η ∈ [0, 0.5] .
In other words, the signal s is right with probability 0.5 + η, and hence the
parameter η determines the precision of s(η). The cost of such accuracy is given
by a linear function C : [0, 1
2
]→ R+, where C(0) = 0.
In this modified environment thus, the history h1 = (0, θy) induces a subgame
where player v must decide the precision of the signal s(η) before making his
choice av3 ∈ {k, f}, and consequently player p must take into account such choice
of η when deciding his own action ap2.
For example, in the extreme case in which hidden borrowing is perfectly de-
tected by the signal, player p prefers not borrow before the election so as to avoid
interest payments under a certain dismissal arising from Assumption 1.1.
Suppose first that v is publicly and exogenously endowed with η ∈ (0, 1
2
). Then, in
the subgame after h1 = (0, θy) and after observing s(η) ∈ {0, b}, a strategy for v is
a probability of reelection φv : {0, b} → [0, 1], and a strategy for p is a probability
of borrowing φp(η, · ) : Θ→ [0, 1]. Consider the strategy profile φ = (φp, φv) ∈ Φ,
defined by
φp(η, θ2) =
0 if θ2 = θ,λp(η) if θ2 = θ.
φv(s(η)) =
0 if s(η) = b,λv(η) if s(η) = 0,
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where λp(η) , λv(η) ∈ (0, 1) are given by
λp(η) =
(1
2
+ η)(1− ρ)y
(1− ε)
(
(1
2
+ η)(1− ρ)y + (1
2
+ η)(ρ− ε)(y − (1 + r)b)
) , (1.7)
λv(η) =
Eρθy − (θ − θ)y
(1
2
− η)(Eεθ(y − (1 + r)b) + εe(θ) + (1− ε)e(θ))
. (1.8)
The strategy profile φ resembles its no-information counterpart of Proposition
3. Now an unproductive incumbent still attempts to generate a budget cycle, but
voter behavior is slightly different: v randomizes only if the signal he gets indicates
that p is not borrowing. As the following result shows, the profile φ conforms to
equilibrium behavior and more importantly, there is a threshold of quality of
information such that after that point voter’s monitoring over the incumbent is
sufficiently tight to deter any election-year spending, which causes the elimination
of PBCs.
Proposition 5. ∃ η < 1
2
: for each η ∈ (0, η), φ is a Bayesian equilibrium of the
subgame after h1 = (0, θy).
Proof. Consider p’s strategy. As in the case of no information acquisition by v,
the optimal strategy of a θ–type is ap2 = 0 because his payoff is certainly reduced
by rb > 0 each time he borrows. In the case of the θ–type, however, his expected
utility of borrowing is given by
Eφ ,s
3∑
t=2
upt = θy +
(
1
2
− η
)
λv(η)
(
Eεθ(y − (1 + r)b) + e(θ) + (1− ε)e(θ)
)
,
while if ap2 = 0, p gets θy+Eρθy. When v randomizes with probability λv(η) after
observing s(η) = 0, then p is indifferent and prone to randomize as φp describes.
This only works for a maximal amount η, after which the expected utility of
borrowing is strictly lower than setting ap2 = 0.
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Now consider φv, and suppose first that s(η) = 0. In this case, v’s posterior
beliefs are given by
Pr(a˜ = 0|s(η) = 0) =
(1
2
+ η) ( ε+ (1− ε)(1− λp(η)) )
(1
2
+ η) ( ε+ (1− ε)(1− λp(η)) ) + (
1
2
− η)(1− ε)λp(η)
.
From equation (1.5), v is indifferent if Pr(a˜ = 0|s(η) = 0)(1 − ρ)y = Pr(a˜ =
b|s(η) = 0)(ρ − ε)(y − R), and this is actually the case when p borrows with
probability λp(η). Therefore randomization after s(η) = 0 is optimal for v. On
the other hand, if s(η) = b, then v′s posterior beliefs make av = k a strictly
dominated strategy for each signal quality, and thus it is optimal for v to fire p
with probability one, as φv describes. The uniqueness of φ follows from the proof
of Proposition 4.
Figure 1.2 shows the probabilities of borrowing by the θ–type and the proba-
bility of reelection after s(η) = 0. When the voter is endowed with a quality of
information η ≥ η, the unproductive politician is deterred from borrowing and
thus any increase in election-year public goods arise from productivity shows. In
this case political budget cycles no longer surge in equilibrium.
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Figure 1.2: Equilibrium profiles as a function of η.
λp(η)
λv(η)
1
0
0 η 0.5
By Lemma 1, the history h1 = (0, θy) is the only contingency of the game Γ in
which v would use s(η). If we incorporate the presence of the—still exogenously
given—signal into the strategy profile σ of Proposition 3, we may define ϕ =
(ϕp, ϕv) ∈ Σ, where
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ϕpt (η, h
t−1
p , θt) =

0 if θt = θ ∀ t, h
t−1
p or θ1 = θ,
0 if (h1p, θ2) = ( (b, θ) , θ),
λp(η) if (h
1
p, θ2) = ( (0, θ) , θ).
ϕv3(s(η), h
2) =

0 if h2 ∈ H, ∀ s(η)
1 if h2 ∈ H, ∀ s(η)
0 if h2 = (0, θy, θy) and s(η) = b,
λv(η) if h
2 = (0, θy, θy) and s(η) = 0.
The difference between σ and ϕ lies in λι(η), ι ∈ {p, v}, and in the use of
information by v and its corresponding effect on p’s action. Denote Γ(η) the game
where v is endowed with a signal of precision η. The following result shows that
a political budget cycle is still an equilibrium outcome even in the presence of
informed voters.
Proposition 6. For each η ∈ (0, η), ϕ is the unique sequential equilibrium of
Γ(η).
Proof. The result follows from Propositions 3–5.
1.4.2 Endogenous Information
Until now it has been assumed that v is endowed with s(η). The exercise,
therefore, has been the theoretical counterpart of the studies for developing coun-
tries summarized by Pande (2011), where voters are exogenously provided with
information regarding politicians’ record and where it is also documented that
better choices easily follow from higher η.
Since the book of Downs (1957)—and the more recent results of Martinelli
(2006)—however, it has been established that non-pivotal voters optimally decide
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gather no information if they must pay for it. Even if the value of information is
positive, once voters take into account the chance of affecting election outcome,
they prefer not to buy info at all, or an arbitrarily small amount in the case that
garbled info is freely available (Martinelli (2006)).
Building from the work of Harsanyi (1980, 1992), the analysis by Feddersen
and Sandroni (2006a,b) shows that a fraction of non-pivotal voters still optimally
pay for information out of a sense of civic duty. While in the two-player game
Γ(η) the voter is pivotal by construction, a positive demand for information is still
the case even if v ∈ [0, 1] when the ethical motive is introduced.
Suppose v must decide the quality of the signal to use after h1 = (0, θy). The
expected benefit for the voter from buying a signal with precision η ∈ (0, 1
2
) is
given by
Π(η; τ) =
∑
ω∈Ap
∑
a˜∈Ap
(
g(0, θ3; a˜, τ)I{a∗v} Pr(a˜|s(η)) Pr(s(η) = ω)
)
,
where Pr(s(η)) is the prior probability of gazing s(η) = ω, Pr(a˜|s(η)) represents
posterior beliefs after each value of s(η) = 0, and a∗v represents optimal action for
the voter in each contingency. This whole expression depends on τ : the higher the
tax rate, the higher the difference of the public good outcomes between different
types of incumbents.
The amount of information endogenously determined by v therefore, is the
solution to the following program
η(y) ∈ arg max
η∈[0, 1
2
]
Π(η; τ)− C(η).
Proposition 7. η(y) is monotone increasing.
Proof. Since Π :
(
0, 1
2
)
×[0, 1]→ R is twice continuously differentiable, by theorem
4 and 6 of Milgrom and Shannon (1994), we just need to check whether Π has
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increasing differences in (η; τ). In effect, since ∂λp(η)/∂y = 0, it follows that
∂2Π(η; y)
∂η∂y
= (θ −Eεθ(1− R
′))
(
q′(η)(π̂(η)− π˜(η)) + q(η)π̂′(η)
)
,
where q′(η) represents the prior probability of gazing s(η) = 0, π̂ = Pr(a˜ =
0|s(η) = 0), and π˜ = Pr(a˜ = 0|s(η) = b). By Assumption (1.2), 1 − R′ > 0,
and since ε ∈ (0, ε), it follows that π̂(η) > π˜(η), and thus Π has increasing
differences. The result follows from the monotonicity theorem in Milgrom and
Shannon (1994).
Propositions 6 and 7 establish that sufficiently rich economies are eventually
free of political budget cycles, because voters are allowed to get arbitrarily well
informed regarding incumbent performance. The map of this result into actual
economies, however, is more subtle. Suppose that τ < 1, so v derives utility from
c = (1 − τ)y − C(η) units of the consumption good. Since the after-election g is
a random variable, it follows from Persico (2000) that the higher the share of the
public good in the consumption bundle, the better informed that v gets, because
they have more resources at stake.
The evidence of Persson and Tabellini (2003) shows that government spending
is higher in economies that are both richer and with a higher fraction of population
over 65 years. Since the latter fact is also positively related with income, the
evidence, in sum, shows that richer countries have higher g, and then voters of
those countries invest more resources in monitoring incumbents.
1.4.3 Data Match
As in § 1.3.1, we can obtain the predictions of Γ(η) regarding spending, output
and probability of reelections generated by the equilibrium ϕ. These data are
shown in Table 1.3.
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Table 1.3: Evidence from the model.
Signal Type Spending Prob. re-election
η ≤ η
(θ, θ)
λp(η): (1,2)
(
1
2
− η
)
λv(η)
1− λp(η): (1,1) 0
(θ, θ) (1,1)
(
1
2
+ η
)
λv(η)
(θ, θ) (1,1) 1
η > η
(θ, θ) (1,1) 0
(θ, θ) (1,1) 1
(θ, θ) (1,1) 1
The conspicuous feature of Table 1.3 is that PBCs no longer arise in economies
with information sufficiently high quality. In other words, there is no variation in
spending.
In the data there actually is variation in spending, which implies that to map
the equilibrium outcome ϕ into the data, it must be the case that the set of
Developed Countries (DC) is given by
DC = { j : ηj ≥ η − δ }, where δ > 0.
Let q be the fraction of developed countries below the threshold η, that is
q ≡
| { j : j ∈ DC , ηj < η } |
|DC |
.
When an econometrician runs a probit regression between reelection and spend-
ing taking into account only Less Developed Countries (LDCs), i.e. co
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η ≤ η, he obtains the following probability of reelection conditional on flat spend-
ing
Pr( re-elec |(1, 1)) =
(0.5 + η)λv(η)(1− ρ)ε+ ρ
(1− ρ)(1− ε)(1− λp(η)) + (1− ρ)ε+ ρ
≡ Φ.
And thus we can put together the evidence for DCs and LDCs as in Table 1.4.
Table 1.4: Match with evidence.
Statistic LDC DC
Pr( PBC ) (1− ρ)(1− ε)λp(η) > q(1− ρ)(1− ε)λp(η)
Pr( re-elec | PBC )
(
1
2
− η
)
λv(η) q
(
1
2
− η
)
λv(η)
≈ >
Pr( re-elec | PBC ) Φ qΦ + (1− q)(ρ+ (1− ρ)ε)
Table 1.4 summarizes the results of the paper. It shows that political budget
cycles are more likely to occur in LCDs, and since such outcome comes from the
equilibrium ϕ, it follows that such PBCs are caused by hidden borrowing by un-
productive politicians. As Table 1.2 shows, we can calibrate the parameters of the
game to make the probabilities of reelection under PBC and flat spending equal,
as § 1.3.1 describes. Finally, in developed countries, since all of those politicians
that generate more public goods in election years are reelected, we obtain that the
small fraction q of politicians that generate PBCs in those countries are punished
at the polls. This features match evidence (i)–(iii) in § 1.1.
Chapter 2
Sectoral Origin of Aggregate
Fluctuations Under Monopolistic
Competition
2.1 Introduction
One of the main objectives in the study of business cycles is identifying the
driving force behind the regular variations in economic activity. Regarding one
of such primitive forces—the occurrence of technology shocks—it has been cus-
tomary assumed, based on a law of large numbers argument, that only aggregate,
economy-wide perturbations are capable of generating business cycle fluctuations.
A fairly recent strand of research, however, has investigated to extent to which
aggregate economic fluctuations may be associated with idiosyncratic, sectoral
shocks. The papers by Long and Plosser (1983) and Horvath (1998) have pro-
vided an important insight in this matter: individual, sectoral perturbations may
actually translate into aggregate fluctuations because of the transmission of such
individual shocks through input-output linkages into the rest of the economy—
even as the numbers of sectors grows unboundedly as in Acemoglu et al. (2012)—
and therefore aggregate fluctuations ensue.
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While the bulk of the literature on the relevance of sectoral shocks has taken
a theoretical approach, the comprehensive study by Foerster, Sarte, and Watson
(2011) has shown that sectoral shocks may indeed be empirically associated with
the aggregate variability of the US Industrial Production (IP) Index. They build a
multisector model calibrated with US data and they show that sectoral shocks may
explain up to half of IP growth variability since 1984, but the actual magnitude of
such quantitative importance is quite sensitive to the assumptions of the model.
The main thrust from the work by Foerster, Sarte, and Watson (2011), how-
ever, is the following: if we want to figure out the fraction of aggregate fluctuations
originating from sectoral shocks, we should first build a multisector growth model
that fairly represents sectoral technology and market structure.
One of the important empirical features ignored in this line of research about
the importance of sectoral perturbations has been the evidence provided by Hall
(1986) and Domowitz, Hubbard, and Petersen (1988), which states that US man-
ufacturing data shows signs of noncompetitive markets and increasing returns
to scale across many industries. When these empirical insights were embedded
by Hornstein (1993) and Rotemberg and Woodford (1995) into a dynamic gen-
eral equilibrium one-sector growth model, the authors found that monopolistic
competition ends up reducing the importance of technology shocks for economic
fluctuations. In other words, market structure has been shown to be an impor-
tant determinant of the effects of technology shocks for output fluctuations in
environments composed of a single sector.
Based on this set of arguments, the purpose of this paper is to build a mul-
tisector growth model to figure out the quantitative importance of idiosyncratic
fluctuations in explaining aggregate business cycles, where the key contribution is
to depart from perfectly competitive markets. More specifically, I build a multisec-
tor growth model with monopolistic competition for which I obtain a reduced-form
factor model as the linearized approximation of its steady state. I then calibrate
the input-output matrix to US data and finally obtain the fraction of IP growth
variability explained by sectoral shocks between 1972-2007. For this exercise I
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borrow heavily from the insights given by Foerster, Sarte, and Watson (2011).
Why a non-competitive market structure may matter in a multi-sector model?
Suppose a technology shock hits a specific sector. Since producers now face a
downward sloping demand, it follows that factor employment and productivity
shocks are negatively related. This effect dampens the traditional positive effect
of technology shocks on labor demand arising from intertemporal substitution,
and therefore I expect the ensuing economy-wide relocation effects of a sectoral
perturbation to be lower.
The quantitative results of the paper show that indeed market structure is a
relevant, potentially overlooked ingredient in the analysis on the importance of
sectoral shocks for aggregate IP fluctuations.
The calibrations show that the presence of monopolistic competition and in-
creasing returns to scale cause a decrease in the fraction of aggregate IP variability
explained by sectoral shocks. In particular, for example, when considering the pe-
riod 1984-2007, the fraction of the standard deviation of the Industrial Production
Index explained by sectoral fluctuations falls from 50% to 28%, that is a 44% drop.
Moreover, the higher the degree of returns to scale in production, the higher the
fraction of IP volatility explained by aggregate shocks.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows: in section § 2.2 I review the key
papers mentioned in this introduction and the quantitative assessment of Foerster,
Sarte, and Watson (2011) in particular. In section § 2.3 I review US evidence
regarding IP fluctuations since 1972 until 2008. Then in section § 2.4, which is
the core of the paper, I present the multisector growth model, I characterize its
equilibrium and finally obtain its reduced-form factor model. In section § 2.5 I use
US the input-output matrix data to calibrate the reduced form of the model and
carry out the quantitative exercises.
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2.2 Literature
The research that concerns this paper has two main branches. The first one
is about the debate initiated with the work of Horvath (1998) that highlights
the theoretical importance of sectoral shocks for aggregate fluctuations. While
this mechanism was previously ruled out based on a law of large numbers type
of argument, Horvath used the framework of Long and Plosser (1983) to make
the point that shocks hitting particular sectors may end up causing aggregate
fluctuations due to the interactions caused by intermediate goods transactions
across linkages of the input-output matrix of the economy.
While Horvath’s argument was contested by Dupor (1999), Horvath showed
that as long as the demand of intermediate goods is uneven across sectors, the
possibility of aggregate effects of sectoral shocks ensued. This conclusion was also
obtained in related formulations by Gabaix (2011) and Acemoglu et al. (2012). In
the former if large sectors are hit then aggregate fluctuations follow, and in the
latter, depending on the topology of the input-output matrix, sectoral shocks also
may cause fluctuations across the whole network.
The main reference for this paper, however, is the work by Foerster, Sarte,
and Watson (2011). In this paper the authors bridge the gap between the two ap-
proaches used for the aggregate effects of sectoral fluctuations. The first approach
comprises the use of statistical factor models (Anderson (1984)) to disentangle
the effect of common versus idiosyncratic shocks in time series volatilities. The
second approach is given by structural models as Long and Plosser (1983). The
leading contribution by Foerster, Sarte, and Watson (2011) is to derive a reduced-
form factor model from their structural version. In this fashion, they are able of
identifying structural sectoral shocks when they calibrate their model using the
input-output US data in its 1998 version. They find that sectoral shocks account
for 50% of IP growth volatility between 1984-2007, but such magnitude could be
considerably lower when varying different ingredients of the model.
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The second strand of literature from which this paper builds is given by Horn-
stein (1993) and Rotemberg and Woodford (1995). These papers build dynamic
general equilibrium growth models where the equilibrium concept is given by
monopolistically competitive markets. In particular, the quantitative results of
Hornstein (1993) show that technology shocks cause lower output growth volatil-
ity compared to perfectly competitive markets.
2.3 Evidence
The statistical and quantitative results provided by Foerster, Sarte, and Wat-
son (2011) are based upon the aggregate and sectoral decomposition of the US
Industrial Production Index between 1972 and 2007. The salient feature of these
date is the decline in the IP variability after 1984 as Figure 2.1 shows.
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Figure 2.1: Industrial Production Annual Growth: Y-o-Y percentage variation.
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In order to identify the source of such lower underlying IP volatility after 1984,
Foerster, Sarte, and Watson (2011) estimate the following factor model1
Xt = ΛFt + ut,
where Xt is the vector containing sectoral growth rates, Ft is the vector of latent
factors, Λ is a matrix of coefficients called loadings, and ut corresponds to sectoral
perturbations.
Building from this model, the authors calculate the importance of sectoral
shocks for IP variability in the following way: they first calculate the covariance
matrix of Xt, that is ΣXX = ΛΣFFΛ
′ +Σuu, and then they obtain the fraction of
IP variability explained by common factors across the sample as
R2(F ) =
ωΛΣFFΛ
′ω
σ2g
, (2.1)
where ω is the vector of average sectoral weights across the sample, and σ2g is the
sample IP variance. They find that 87% of IP standard deviation after 1984 is
caused by aggregate shocks, but they acknowledge that such statistical result may
underestimate the importance of sectoral shocks because such local perturbations
may appear as common shocks due to the contagion of initial, local shocks through
input-output linkages. This is why they build the structural, multisector model
from which they identify sectoral shocks and re-run the sectoral decomposition
exercise. In the benchmark model they propose, sectoral shocks account for 50%
of aggregate IP standard deviation for the period 1984-2007. The results they
obtain, though, are very sensitive to the assumptions they impose and all the
models they consider are based on perfectly competitive markets. Since Hornstein
(1993) found relatively lower effects of technology shocks on output fluctuations
in a one-sector model when markets depart from perfect competition, such result
may carry over into a multisector setting. Therefore, that is the question I tackle
in the following section.
1See Anderson (1984).
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2.4 Model
Consider an economy composed by N sectors indexed by j = 1, . . . , N . In each
of these sectors there exists a firm that produces a final good Yjt in period t using
both intermediate goods qjt(s), s ∈ [0, 1]—arising from the same sector—and final
goods Mijt from sectors i = 1, . . . , N .
The technology employed by these final good producers is given by
Yjt = Q
1−
∑N
i=1 γij
jt
N∏
i=1
M
γij
ijt , (2.2)
Qjt =
(∫ 1
0
qjt(s)
1
µds
)µ
, (2.3)
where 1 < µ <∞, and γij corresponds to the typical element of the economy-wide
input-output matrix Γ. In this layer markets are perfectly competitive, that is,
final good producers take prices of their input as given.
Each variety s ∈ [0, 1] of intermediate good in any sector, in turn, is produced
by monopolists that use the following technology
qjt(s) = Ajt
(
Kjt(s)
αjLjt(s)
1−αj
)ξ
− φ , (2.4)
where αj ∈ (0, 1), ξ ≥ 1, Kjt(s) and Ljt(s) denote capital and labor services, and
φ > 0 is a fixed cost of production.
The sector-specific productivity shock Ajt follow the process
lnAjt = lnAjt−1 + εjt. (2.5)
To complete the description of the environment, consider an infinitely lived
representative consumer with preferences over the stream of consumption of final
40
goods Cjt and aggregate labor Ljt given by
E0
∞∑
t=0
βt
N∑
j=1
(
C1−σjt − 1
1− σ
− ψLjt
)
. (2.6)
As is customary, assume a positive rate of depreciation δ ∈ (0, 1), which implies
that aggregate capital evolves according to
Kjt = (1− δ)Kjt−1 +Xjt, δ ∈ (0, 1). (2.7)
An allocation {Cjt, Xjt,Mijt, Yjt, (Kjt(s), Ljt(s)) s∈[0,1] }
N
i,j=1 for this environ-
ment is feasible if it satisfies the following resource constraints∫ 1
0
Kjt(s)ds ≤ Kjt (2.8)∫ 1
0
Ljt(s)ds ≤ Ljt (2.9)
Cjt +Xjt +
N∑
i=1
Mjit ≤ Yjt (2.10)
2.4.1 Equilibria
Assuming that the representative consumer is the owner of both capital and
firms, that intermediate good producers hire sector-specific capital and labor ser-
vices in perfectly competitive factor markets at prices rjt and wjt, and that there
is no entry or exit of firms in the intermediate goods sector, it follows that profit
maximization by final good producers implies
qjt(s) =
pjt(s)
µ
1−µQjt(∫ 1
0
pjt(s)
1
1−µds
)µ , (2.11)
Mijt = γij
Yjt
Pit
, (2.12)
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where pjt(s) is the price of variety s of intermediate good in sector j, and Pit is
the price of the final good of sector i.
Intermediate good producers, thereby, face the intermediate variety demand
(2.11), which they consider to solve the following program
max
pjt(s)
pjt(s)qjt(s)− C(wjt, rjt; qjt(s)),
where the cost function C : R2 → R is defined by
C(w, r; q) = min
K,L
wL+ rK s.t. (2.4).
Profit maximization by monopolists then, implies the customary pricing rule
pjt(s) = µCqjt(s) , (2.13)
that calls for price as a fixed markup over marginal costs, which are in turn given
by
Cqjt(s) = ξ
−1A
− 1
ξ
jt
(
wt
1− αj
)1−αj ( rt
αj
)αj
(qjt(s) + φ)
1
ξ
−1
Since I assume that sectoral shocks are embedded in the production of final
goods, it follows that each monopolist faces the same within-sector shock, and
therefore they all end up setting the same within-sector intermediate good price.
In such symmetric case consequently, it is the case that pjt(s) = pt, and as in
Hornstein (1993) I normalize to one.
Hence, using (2.13), I get factor prices as functions of sectoral capital and
labor services given by
wjt =(1− αj)
ξ
µ
Ajt
(
K
αj
jt L
1−αj
jt
)ξ
L−1jt
rjt =αj
ξ
µ
Ajt
(
K
αj
jt L
1−αj
jt
)ξ
K−1jt ,
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and finally I can express monopolists’ profits as follows
Π(Kjt, Ljt, Ajt) =
(
1−
ξ
µ
)
Ajt
(
K
αj
jt L
1−αj
jt
)ξ
− φ (2.14)
Now it is possible to setup the optimization problem faced by the representative
consumer
maxE0
∞∑
t=0
βt
N∑
j=1
(
C1−σjt − 1
1− σ
− ψLjt
)
s.t. Cjt +Xjt ≤ wjtLjt + rjtLjt +Πjt
Kjt+1 = (1− δ)Kjt +Xjt
K0 given
Assuming, for the sake of simplicity, that profits from the intermediate sector
are fully taxed, the first-order necessary conditions for an optimal allocation are
given by the following marginal conditions and Euler equations
ψLjt =C
−σ
jt (1− αj)
ξ
µ
Ajt
(
K
αj
jt L
1−αj
jt
)ξ
(2.15)
C−σjt =βC
−σ
jt+1
(
αj
ξ
µ
Ajt+1
(
K
αj
jt+1L
1−αj
jt+1
)ξ
K−1jt+1 + 1− δ
)
(2.16)
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An equilibrium allocation for this environment is characterized by the following
equations
ψLjt =C
−σ
jt (1− αj)
ξ
µ
Ajt
(
K
αj
jt L
1−αj
jt
)ξ
(2.17)
C−σjt =βC
−σ
jt+1
(
αj
ξ
µ
Ajt+1
(
K
αj
jt+1L
1−αj
jt+1
)ξ
K−1jt+1 + 1− δ
)
(2.18)
Yjt =
(
Ajt
(
K
αj
jt L
1−αj
jt
)ξ
− φ
)1−∑Ni=1 γij N∏
i=1
M
γij
ijt (2.19)
Cjt+Xjt +
N∑
i=1
Mjit ≤ Yjt (2.20)
Kjt =(1− δ)Kjt−1 +Xjt (2.21)
Mijt = γij
Yjt
Pit
, (2.22)
where (2.17)-(2.18) come from representative consumer’s problem, (2.19) is the
technology of final goods production, (2.20)-(2.21) are the resource constraints
and evolution of capital, and finally (2.19) comes from final producer’s optimal
behavior.
Since I assumed the normalization pjt = 1 across intermediate good producers,
and moreover the final goods sector operates under perfect competition, it follows
that by replacing optimal monopolist behavior (2.11)-(2.12) into the zero-profits
condition of final sector firms
PjtYjt −
∫ 1
0
pjt(s)qjt(s)ds−
N∑
i=1
PitMijt = 0,
I can solve for the vector of prices of final goods P = (P1t, . . . , PNt) as the fixed
point of the mapping T : [0, 1]N → [0, 1]N , where
Tj(P ) =
N∏
i=1
(
Pit
γij
) γij
1−
∑
i γij
+
N∑
i=1
γij. (2.23)
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Now, a log-linear approximation around the steady state of the equilibrium
characterized by (2.17)–(2.22) gives the following set of equations for each sector,
where the hat notation denotes percent deviation of the respective steady state
value
L̂jt =− σĈjt + Âjt + ξ
(
αjK̂jt + (1− αj)L̂jt
)
(2.24)
−σ
(
Ĉjt − Ĉjt+1
)
=(1− β(1− δ))
(
Âjt+1 + (ξαj − 1)K̂jt+1 + ξ(1− αj)L̂jt+1
)
(2.25)
Ŷjt =Âjt + ξ(1−
N∑
i=1
γij)
(
αjK̂jt + (1− αj)L̂jt
)
+
N∑
i=1
γijM̂ijt
(2.26)
CjĈjt+XjX̂jt +
N∑
i=1
MjiM̂jit = YjŶjt (2.27)
K̂jt =(1− δ)K̂jt−1 + δX̂jt (2.28)
M̂ijt = Ŷjt (2.29)
In order to write down the equilibrium equations across sectors more com-
pactly, let lt = (L̂1t, . . . , L̂Nt)
T , mt = (M̂11t, . . . , M̂1Nt, M̂21t, . . . , M̂NNt)
T , and so
forth.
Hence, (2.24)–(2.29) can be expressed in vector form as follows
lt =− σct + at + ξ (αdkt + (IN − αd)lt) (2.30)
−σct =β˜ (at+1 + (ξαd − IN)kt+1 + ξ(IN − αd)lt+1)− σct+1 (2.31)
yt =at + ξ(IN − Σγ) (αdkt + (IN − αd)lt) + Γ˜mt (2.32)
yt =scct + sxxt + smmt (2.33)
kt+1 =(1− δ)kt + δxt (2.34)
mt =Myyt (2.35)
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where β˜ ≡ 1− β(1− δ), My ≡ 1N×1 ⊗ IN ,
αd =

α1 0 · · · 0
0 α2 · · · 0
...
...
. . .
...
0 0 · · · αN
 ,
Γ˜ =

γ11 0 · · · 0 γ21 0 · · · 0 · · · γN1 0 · · · 0
0 γ12 · · · 0 0 γ22 · · · 0 · · · 0 γN2 · · · 0
...
...
. . .
...
...
...
. . .
... · · ·
...
...
. . .
...
0 0 · · · γ1N 0 0 · · · γ2N · · · 0 0 · · · γNN
 ,
Σγ =

∑N
i=1 γi1 0 · · · 0
0
∑N
i=1 γi2 · · · 0
...
...
. . .
...
0 0 · · ·
∑N
i=1 γiN
 ,
and sc and sx are diagonal matrices containing the steady state sectoral ratios
Cj/Yj and Xj/Yj on its diagonal, respectively, and finally
sm =

M11
Y1
· · · M1N
Y1
0 · · · 0 0 · · · 0
0 · · · 0 M21
Y2
· · · M2N
Y2
0 · · · 0
... · · ·
...
... · · ·
...
... · · ·
...
0 · · · 0 0 · · · 0 MN1
YN
· · · MNN
YN
 .
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2.4.2 System reduction
In the appendix section A I use (2.30)–(2.35) to get the following stochastic
system difference equation
(
−σ∆c β˜∆k
0 Θk
)
Et
(
ct+1
kt+1
)
=
(
−σ 0
−Ωc Ωk
)(
ct
kt
)
+
(
−β˜∆a
0
)
Etat+1
+
(
0
∆ya
)
at
(2.36)
As in Foerster, Sarte, and Watson (2011), I use the solution algorithm by King
and Watson (2002) to solve the first-order linear difference system (2.36). Such
algorithm tries to pick iteratively from the array of endogenous variables those
governed by dynamic identities, so as to get smaller systems in each iteration. By
means of such algorithm, I finally get the following solution in state space form(
kt+1
ct
)
=
(
Mk Ma
Πck Πca
)(
kt
at
)
(2.37)
Now, by replacing (2.37) into the linearized version of the production function
of final goods (2.32), it follows that
yt+1 = Ψyt + Ξat +Πat+1,
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where2
Ψ ≡ ΠMkΠ
−1
,
Ξ ≡ ΠMa − ΠMkΠ
−1
Π,
Π ≡ ∆ya − σ∆ycΠca,
Π ≡ −σ∆ycΠck + ξ∆yk.
Since the model is aimed at studying output fluctuations, I first differentiate
the latter equation and use the log-linear structure of sectoral shocks (2.5) to get
the following vector ARMA(1,1) model for sectoral output growth
∆yt+1 = Ψ∆yt + Ξεt +Πεt+1. (2.38)
By means of (2.38) therefore, and denoting L as the lag operator, I can identify
structural sectoral shocks from data on sectoral IP growth ∆yt+1 as follows
εt = (Π + ΞL)
−1 (IN −ΨL)∆yt+1. (2.39)
2See appendix A for details.
48
2.5 Quantitative Evidence
By means of the structural identification (2.39) I proceed with que quantitative
analysis in the following way. For ∆yt+1 I use data of sectors coming from the
IP index, and for the input-output matrix I use the 1998 data as in Foerster,
Sarte, and Watson (2011). I take the rest of parameters from customary values
in business cycle literature, namely σ = 1, ψ = 1, β = 0.99, and δ = 0.025. For
the the fixed cost of production of intermediate goods I set the value given by
Hornstein (1993), that is φ = 1. Finally, I set different values for the degree of
returns to scale ξ.
I perform two alternative calibrations for Σεε: the first one is given by a
diagonal matrix with variances given by the values implied by (2.39). For the
second one I associate the following factor model with ε
εt = ΛsSt + νt, (2.40)
where I estimate Λs through factor analysis and consequently compute the fraction
of aggregate variability that comes from sectoral shocks as follows
R2(S) =
ωTΛsΣSSΛ
T
s ω
σ2g
.
Table 2.1 contains the results of the quantitative exercise. It has two panels,
which differ in the degree of returns to scale ξ. In each panel I show the results
for the subperiods 1972-1983 and 1984-2007. The first two columns show the
data, where ρij is the average correlation between sectoral growth rates across
the sample period, and σg corresponds to the standard deviation of the IP index.
The third and fourth columns show the statistics when the covariance matrix of
sectoral shocks εt is given by a diagonal matrix with variances calculated from
(2.39). And the last three columns show the corresponding results using (2.40).
Since the latter calibration of Σεε allows the estimation of a factor model, the
last column of Table 2.1 shows the fraction of model IP variability explained by
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aggregate shocks.
Table 2.1: Sectoral correlation and IP growth volatility.
A. ξ = 1.05.
Data Σεε: diagonal Σεε: factor model
Period ρij σg ρij σg ρij σg R
2(S)
1972-1983 .26 8.35 .16 4.5 .11 8.1 0.87
1984-2007 .11 3.51 .16 3.4 .11 6.0 0.53
B. ξ = 1.1.
Data Σεε: diagonal Σεε: factor model
Period ρij σg ρij σg ρij σg R
2(S)
1972-1983 .26 8.35 .17 5.1 .24 9.17 .89
1984-2007 .11 3.51 .17 3.7 .36 2.7 .72
The third column of Panel A shows that the reduced form of the model with
monopolistic competition spits out a much lower sectoral average correlation
across sectors than the data for the first subsample, although it overestimates
it during the great moderation. In the case of the factor model, such average
correlation is still lower, but the main point is the fraction of IP variability ex-
plain by aggregate shocks: the model shows that 87% of IP standard deviation is
explained by common sources. The perfect competition setting of Foerster, Sarte,
50
and Watson (2011) shows 80% for the same period. In other words, the consider-
ation of monopolistic competition and increasing returns reduces the importance
of sectoral shocks in 35%.
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Panel B repeats the calculations for a higher degree of returns to scale. When ξ
grows in roughly five percent there is a slightly increase in the sectoral correlation
for both subsamples in the case of Σεε diagonal, which is also the case in when
the factor model is used.
The main result of the paper though lies in the las column. For ξ = 1.05 the
fraction of aggregate IP variability accounted for by sectoral shocks falls to 11%
for 1972-1983 and to 28% for the latter subsample, respectively. In other words,
the introduction of monopolistic competition and increasing returns imply that
the fraction of IP standard deviation explain by local perturbations falls from
50%—which is the benchmark by Foerster, Sarte, and Watson (2011)—to 28%,
which is a drop of 44% in such measure.
Chapter 3
Conclusion and Discussion
I have developed a simple dynamic game of imperfect information that is ca-
pable of encompassing previous analyses on PBCs and matching recent panel
data. The main thrust of the analysis is that in the unique data-matching equi-
librium, increases in election-year government spending are exclusively caused by
unproductive incumbents, which portraits dismal perspective on PBCs, i.e. they
are far from reflecting efficient signalling by productive incumbents. Information
acquisition has a key role in the scarce presence of PBCs in developed countries.
A straightforward, relevant avenue of research is considering the case in which
public goods help promote private investment (v.gr. Jones, Manuelli, and Rossi
(1993)). In such case, economies with unskilled politicians in office in the first
place may become stagnant because voters may only afford inexpensive, noisy
information regarding incumbents, which translates into sloppy choices at the
polls, and ensuing low future output, which affords again only garbled information.
In sum, there is the possibility of economic stagnation due to the endogenous,
permanent presence of bad politicians in office.
In the second chapter I have built a multisector growth model to contribute
to the discussion on the importance of sectoral shocks for aggregate fluctuations.
The main technical point has been the incorporation of monopolistic competi-
tion and increasing returns, ingredients that were supposedly relevant in heuristic
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discussions.
The quantitative results have indeed shown that assuming competitive markets
across sectors amplify the importance of sectoral perturbations for the aggregate
performance of the US Industrial Production Index. When departing from the
competitive setting, intermediate good producers face a downward sloping demand
that drives them to modify input demands when technology shocks show up.
This effect, in theory, should imply less transmission of such local technological
perturbations.
The quantitative results derived from the reduced form of the structural model
have confirmed such intuition. On the one hand sectoral shocks now explain a
lower fraction of aggregate IP variability, and on the other one, the quantitative
relevance of sectoral shocks appears to be a decreasing function of the degree of
returns to scale in production.
Since the evidence of US sectors appears to be consistent with non competi-
tive markets in some studies (Hall (1986) and Domowitz, Hubbard, and Petersen
(1988)), the model and the quantitative exercise carried out here seems a direction
not to be overlooked.
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Appendix A
Derivation of (2.36)
Replacing the linearized Euler equation (2.31) into (2.30) we get
lt = (IN − ξ(IN − αd))
−1 (−σct + at + ξαdkt) ,
which is reinserted into (2.31) to get
−σ∆c ct+1 + β˜∆kkt+1 = −σct − β˜∆aat+1,
where ∆c ≡ β˜ξ(IN − αd)Φl + IN , ∆k ≡ ξαd − IN + ξ
2(IN − αd)Φlαd, ∆a ≡
IN + ξ(IN − αd)Φl, and Φl ≡ (IN − ξ(IN − αd))
−1. Hence we have the first part
of Eq. (2.36).
For deriving the second equation comprising (2.36), I replace (2.30) and (2.35)
into the linearized production function of final goods (2.32) to get
yt = ∆yaat − σ∆yc ct +∆ykkt,
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where
∆ya ≡(IN − Σγ)
−1 (IN + ξ(IN − Σγ)(IN − αd)Φl)
∆yc ≡ξ(IN − αd)Φl
∆yk ≡ξ(αd + ξ(IN − αd)Φlαd)
I finally use (2.33)-(2.35) into the last equation to get
Θk kt+1 = ∆yaat − Ωc ct + Ωk kt,
where
Θk ≡ δ
−1(IN − smMy)
−1sx
Ωc ≡ σ∆yc + (IN − smMy)
−1sc
Ωc ≡ ∆yk + δ
−1(1− δ)(IN − smMy)
−1sx.
